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Abstract 
This article explores , from the point of view of both law and linguistics, how far the 
application and effect of the law of registered trade marks is shaped not only by 
legislative initiative but also by changing consumer behaviour and the shifting linguistic 
currency of the particular signs used (or proposed for use) as marks.  It does so by 
focusing on the thirty-year campaign to register HAVE A BREAK for a chocolate bar, 
marketed as ‘KitKat’.  It considers the changing approach of courts both to inherent 
distinctiveness and to distinctiveness acquired through use.  It also considers the 
relationship between the average consumer test for distinctiveness and the public 
interest in leaving certain signs free.  It suggests that while the present trade mark 
regime is open to the registration of slogans, it is not clear that courts have sufficiently 
considered the public interest implications of increasing trade mark protection in this 
way.  
1. Introduction 
 This article explores how far the application and effect of the law of registered 
trade marks is shaped not only by legislative initiative but also by changing consumer 
behaviour and the shifting currency of the particular signs used (or proposed for use) as 
marks.  The article discusses these questions by looking closely at a thirty-year 
campaign of litigation, first by Rowntree, then the merged company Rowntree 
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Mackintosh, then later by the successor company Nestlé, to register the slogan HAVE A 
BREAK for its chocolate bar marketed as KitKat.1  Through a longitudinal study of that 
campaign we show how the registration of slogans, which play an important role in 
modern marketing, has been approached by the courts both with regard to inherent 
distinctiveness and to distinctiveness acquired through use. We also consider how 
difficulties in assessing the essential function of a trade mark as an indicator of 
commercial origin have been addressed by reference to the legal standard of the 
average consumer supplemented by empirical survey evidence, and how far public 
interest considerations are taken account of in registration decisions. Our findings point 
to complications, as well as benefits, associated with the widely acknowledged 
increased receptiveness, following implementation of the EU Trade Mark Directive (TM 
Directive),2 to registration of signs composed of popular words or phrases, of which 
slogans are the prime example.   
 Our analysis of the HAVE A BREAK litigation follows on from a previous study 
undertaken by the authors, 3 which examined how far short verbal expressions used in 
commerce (of several kinds including titles, headlines and slogans) are protectable as 
intellectual property, either under the law of copyright or the law of registered and 
unregistered trade marks, or both.  Of particular interest in that earlier article were 
issues raised by multiple meanings conveyed by short verbal expressions, especially 
how such meanings might affect the status of such expressions as intellectual property. 
Discussion focused accordingly on how varying effects communicated by word marks 
are disentangled by the courts in applying legal provisions in respective areas of law.  In 
this article we extend that earlier analysis, by examining how far the trade mark 
registration process is anchored in semiotic and market contexts in which any given 
application is made. Our discussion takes a different form from the approach we 
adopted in the earlier article.  It concentrates solely on trade mark registration.  And it 
                                                             
1 The bar generally known as 'KitKat' has also been marketed, sometimes simultaneously, under variant 
other marks including ‘Kit Kat’. We discuss the brand’s history and relation to multiple marks and slogans 
below (passim, but see in particular n6, n8, n9, n14). In this article we use variants where necessary for 
the argument but refer generically using the more common designation 'KitKat'. A full listing of registered 
(and deceased) UK and EU KitKat marks can be found on the trade mark register at: 
www.ipo.gov.uk/tmtext/. 
2 First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to 
trade marks (2008/95/EC; formerly EEC 89/04). 
3 J. Davis and A. Durant, ‘To protect or not to protect? The eligibility of commercially-used short verbal 
texts for copyright and trade mark protection’ (2012) 4 IPQ 345. 
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seeks to establish a different point: that changes in the legal protection of trade marks 
over time can be understood more fully if related to the social and linguistic contexts in 
which they are introduced. Such contexts, we suggest, impact on the signifying effects, 
and so commercial functioning, of the various signs that the law protects through its 
trade mark regime. 
 The article begins with an account of how the HAVE A BREAK slogan4 was first 
used in promoting the KitKat chocolate bar.  Our account describes how adoption of the 
HAVE A BREAK slogan reflected changing consumer habits as well as the brand owner’s 
marketing strategy, although of course the two were (as they always are) closely 
interrelated.  The article then presents a detailed narrative of the prolonged battle 
between Rowntree Mackintosh (and its successor Nestlé) to register the slogan HAVE A 
BREAK in the face of equally prolonged opposition from Mars Ltd, a rival confectionary 
company.  It is argued that the narrative we present is shaped not only by relevant 
changes in the law governing trade mark protection,5 but also by larger social changes 
and by changes in the overall effect of the contested expression (‘have a break’).  The 
article concludes with brief accounts of three more recent cases, Specsavers 
International v Asda Stores, Colloseum Holding v Levi Strauss and Smart Technologies ULC 
v OHIM6, which illustrate the continuing significance of issues probed in the HAVE A 
BREAK litigation; we also comment on the approach taken by the courts to the public 
interest and on wider processes of legislative change in trade mark law.  
                                                             
4 ‘Slogan’ is not a well-defined term of art either in trade mark law (where it is a concept developed by the 
case law) or in advertising regulation. Nor is slogan a technical term in marketing, a discipline less 
concerned than law with precise definition or strict authority (and some marketers use related terms 
almost interchangeably including ‘tagline’ and ‘strapline’, as well as, varying between countries, ‘theme 
line’, ‘baseline’ and ‘signature’). Informally, slogans are a sub-genre among cognate forms including 
adages, maxims, aphorisms, proverbs and mottoes, or, spoken and combined with music, jingles. They 
share with those other genres the characteristic of being short, pithy, and conveying either a full 
proposition in a simple sentence, or an elliptical meaning elaborated by the reader through inference. 
What makes slogans distinctive is not merely that they encapsulate a commercial sales message or 
organisational mission or values statement; or that they are memorable. Slogans often simulate colloquial 
or idiomatic expressions as a kind of semantic grab of presumed wisdom or commonsense: they exploit 
overlap with related genres so as to present themselves as an apparent echo of what some unattributed 
class of people already think, rather than something an audience is being encouraged to think. For 
discussion from a marketer’s perspective, see Nigel Rees, Slogans  (Allen & Unwin, London,1982). Because 
slogans are commonly used commercially in either graphically distinctive or variant fonts, for 
convenience we indicate in the text that a given phrase is a slogan by presenting it in upper case 
characters.  
5 Principally  the TM Directive and the Council Regulation ((EC) No. 207/2009, formerly Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 40/94) (TM Regulation) as well as, in the UK, the Trade Marks Act 1994. 
6 Case C-252/12 Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd v Asda Stores Ltd [2013] ETMR 46, Case C-12/12 
Colloseum Holding AG v Levi Strauss & Co [2013] ETMR 34 and Case C-311/11P Smart Technologies ULC v 
OHIM [2012] ETMR 49. 
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2.1 KitKat:  the brand 
 What is now known as the KitKat chocolate bar was first put on the market in 
1935 by Rowntree, a confectionary company based in York.  It was, and still is, a milk 
chocolate bar composed of three layers of wafer covered with chocolate, conventionally 
called ‘fingers’. The size and number of the fingers varies, depending on the particular 
product design (most KitKat bars have 2 or 4 fingers).   
Although accounts differ in minor respects, the early history of the ‘KitKat’ bar 
illustrates the importance Rowntree already placed on its marketing.  Originally, the bar 
was known as ‘Rowntree’s Chocolate Crisp’ and was sold in red and white packaging. 7  
It would appear that, in 1937, the bar was renamed and marketed as ‘Kit Kat Chocolate 
Crisp’.  At some point during the war, however, Rowntree was unable to source the milk 
traditionally used to make the Chocolate Crisp. Instead, it marketed a dark chocolate bar 
named only ‘Kit Kat’, which was sold in blue and white packaging.  The new bar carried 
an explanation that this bar was in effect the Chocolate Crisp without the milk.8  
Understandably Rowntree wanted to differentiate this wartime bar from its popular, 
milk-chocolate ‘Chocolate Crisp’.  After the war (again accounts differ as to exactly 
when), Rowntree reverted to the bar’s original recipe and its red and white packaging.  
At this time, the bar still carried both names, ‘KitKat’ and ’Chocolate Crisp’, with the 
former in a more prominent position.   By 1949, however, the words ‘Chocolate Crisp; 
had been dropped entirely and the red and white packaging with the words ‘KitKat’ 
became the distinctive bar we are familiar with today.  It is entirely possible that 
Rowntree had come to see the name ’KitKat’ as having greater potential for 
                                                             
7 Rowntree registered the term ’KIT-KAT’ as a trade mark in 1911, for goods in Class 30:  
www.ipo.gov.uk/tmcase/Results/UK00000332454 (last visited 14 November 2014). This mark appears 
not to have been used, however, and is shown by the UK Intellectual Property Office as ‘renewal 2005’, 
but ‘dead’). In the 1920s, Rowntree launched a brand of boxed chocolates entitled ’Kit Cat’, and registered 
KIT-CAT in 1927 (UK00000483896); ‘Kit Cat’ product remained on sale into the 1930s. According to the 
company's corporate narrative, Rowntree registered KIT-CAT at the same time the company shifted focus 
to its ’Black Magic’ and ’Dairy Box’ brands. The ’Kit Cat’ brand shrank and was eventually discontinued. 
According to company mythology, the original four-finger bar was developed after a worker at the 
Rowntree York Factory put a suggestion into a recommendation box for a snack that ’a man could take to 
work in his pack’. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kit_Kat (last visited 17 June 2014). 
8 According to the packaging, ‘Kit Kat’ was the ‘nearest possible product to the Chocolate Crisp at the 
present time’.  Another said, ‘Our standard Chocolate Crisp will be reintroduced as soon as milk is 
available.’ http://www.news.com.au/photos-e6frflwr-1225952593019?page=8 (last visited 17 June 
2014). 
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distinctiveness, in a trade mark sense, if used on its own rather than conjoined with the 
descriptive name  ‘Chocolate Crisp’.  
 The name KIT-KAT had been registered by Rowntree as a mark in April 1911, in 
a later abandoned hyphenated form.9   The present trade mark, KIT KAT,10 was 
registered in 1962 for goods in class 30: cocoa, chocolate, chocolates, chocolate biscuits 
and non-medicated confectionery; other classes were added subsequently (09, 16, 21, 
28, 41 and 43).  In 1957, Rowntree introduced the slogan HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A 
KITKAT (a slogan coined by the London advertising agency JWT and widely attributed 
to copy-writer Donald Gillies)11; use was made of the slogan both in advertising and on 
packaging.   Key to the advertising, which used the tagline HAVE A BREAK, was the 
concept of the consumer taking a break from some activity, whether work or leisure 
related, in order to eat a KitKat.12 Related television adverts had been introduced in the 
mid-1950s, preceding the tagline itself, which nonetheless depicted characters taking 
time off to eat a KitKat.  Those adverts included one featuring a housewife (for whom 
KitKat was her ‘secret treasure’) as well as others showing inter alia shop assistants, 
‘char’ ladies, bicyclists and barristers all taking time out to savour a KitKat.  The 
adoption of the tagline HAVE A BREAK was evidently intended to underline this theme.  
While between 1972 and 1976 Rowntree Mackintosh moved away from HAVE A 
BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT to a variety of alternative expressions in its advertising, in 
1976 it reverted to using the slogan HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT as the product’s 
principal slogan.   
 The slogan HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT is now well-known worldwide and 
regularly features in consumer lists of favourite commercial slogans.13 As became 
significant in later stages of the HAVE A BREAK litigation,14 the slogan has a number of 
                                                             
9 UK00000332454, now defunct. The alternative spelling KIT-CAT was registered in 1927. 
10 From 1939 onwards, variants of KIT-KAT had been registered in relation to various classes of goods 
and with different get-ups (e.g. in terms of font, red background, use of the oval shape around the name). 
11 The slogan was registered, also for Class 30 and with a hyphen between the two phrases, in 1978 
(UK00001104711), and later with a full stop in the middle and an exclamation mark at the end in 1983 
(UK00001196452). A range of more distant variants have been registered subsequently. 
12 During the war, by contrast, the tagline was, ‘What active people need’. 
http://www.nestleprofessional.com/uk/en/SiteArticles/Pages/History_of_KitKat.aspx?UrlReferrer=https
%3a%2f%2fwww.google.co.uk%2f (last visited 17 June 2014). 
13 See Rees, Slogans, or JJ.Gabay, Gabay’s Copywriting Compendium, 3rd edition (Hodder, London, 2010). 
14 See comments of Sedley LJ, Société des produits Nestlé SA v Mars UK Ltd [2003] EWCA 
Civ 1072 at [49]. 
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features which presumably contribute to that success.  Marketers typically argue, for 
example, that a slogan should consist of up to seven words, draw on idiomatic language 
as if reiterating an established viewpoint and evoke a situation or scenario (some also 
show verbal or figurative invention, such as alliteration or rhyme, metaphor, or 
understatement).15 HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT shows such characteristics.16 It 
consists of two parallel short clauses such that a theme of taking a break from some 
form of activity creates superimposed on that motif an encouragement to buy and eat a 
KitKat, not least because the product name is made the final word. What gave the slogan 
particular impact when first introduced, however, was another aspect of its form: that 
the word ‘break’ is ambiguous between the meaning of an interlude away from an 
occupation and that of snapping the chocolate fingers of which the physical bar consists. 
This ambiguity was foregrounded especially when the slogan was used in conjunction 
with visual depictions of a KitKat bar (e.g. in TV advertisements), as well as in some of 
Nestlé’s print advertising which laid out the slogan typographically with an image of a 
snapping chocolate finger in the position normally occupied by the word ‘break’. At the 
time of earliest use of the HAVE A BREAK slogan, that double meaning further alluded 
conceptually to a convenient and innovative utility associated with KitKat design, which 
offered an easily breakable snack bar, while by the end of the litigation any such 
technical effect was devoid of novelty, having been adopted in many other products. 
2.2 The litigation 
 It was in 1976, when the company reverted to HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT, 
that Rowntree Mackintosh (a company formed by merger in 1969) first applied to 
register HAVE A BREAK in Part B of the Trade Mark Register (under TMA 1938), against 
‘cocoa, chocolate, chocolates, chocolate biscuits (other than biscuits for animals), and 
non-medical confectionary’, all goods in Class 30.    
2.2.1 The legal battle to register ‘Have a Break’ commences 
                                                             
15 On creative use of words in slogans and straplines, see G. Myers, Words in Ads (Edward Arnold, London, 
1994), or the classic (but now dated) study, G. Leech, English in Advertising: a linguistic study of 
advertising in Great Britain (Longman, London, 1966). 
16 Between the 1970s and 1990s, this slogan was also registered in variant forms: consistently in upper-
case characters, but either with a hyphen or comma between the two clauses and with either no 
punctuation or with an exclamation mark at the end. 
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 At the time of Rowntree Mackintosh’s first application, in order to be registered 
in Part B of the Register a trade mark had to be capable of distinguishing the goods of 
the proprietor from other goods where no such connection existed.  In determining 
whether a mark was capable of distinguishing in this way, the court had to have regard 
to whether it was inherently capable of distinguishing and, where it was not, whether it 
had become distinctive by virtue of the use made of it on the market.17   In response, 
Mars Ltd initiated its equally lengthy opposition to Rowntree Mackintosh’s application 
to register HAVE A BREAK.18  Among its grounds for opposition, Mars argued that HAVE 
A BREAK did not constitute a trade mark within the meaning of the 1938 Act, as it was 
not a mark used or proposed to be used in relation to goods as a badge of origin, in 
effect because it was not a mark at all but a slogan.19    
 At the Registry, Mars also sought to argue that there had in recent years been an 
‘emergence’ of an ‘anytime food market’, and that ‘those who seek to supply it would 
want to have the freedom to use words such as ‘snack’ and ‘break’ in relation to their 
own goods’.20   In reply, Rowntree noted that Kit Kats had been sold since 1939 and that 
over 600 million had been consumed.  Further, they claimed to have spent about £641 
million in advertising KitKats and that they had first used the phrase HAVE A BREAK, 
HAVE A KITKAT in 1957.  Since then, that phrase had appeared on wrappers, packaging 
and posters, as well as in television advertisements.  According to Mr. Reid, for 
Rowntree:21 
                                                             
17 Section 10(1) of the 1938 Act states that for a trade mark to be registrable in Part B of the register it 
must be capable of distinguishing the goods for which it is registered as connected with the proprietor of 
mark from goods of other traders.  To determine whether it is distinctive, factors to consider under 
s10(2) are whether the trade mark is inherently capable of distinguishing and hence capable of 
distinguishing) by reason of the use made of the mark.  
18 HAVE A BREAK Trade Mark [1993] RPC 217. In fact it was not until the early 1980s that the application 
and its opposition were considered by the Registry and then by the High Court and Court of Appeal. 
19 ibid, 218. 
20 ibid, 219.  Mars developed this argument in evidence from the Managing Director of their confectionery 
division: the ‘break’ concept, in short, should not be made proprietary because the word was part of an 
emerging semantic and commercial nexus. They contended that the new ‘anytime food’ market ‘existed to 
satisfy the modern habit of eating or drinking instantly available consumables during “breaks”, which 
occur naturally, or which people are encouraged to take, during periods of work, leisure, boredom, stress 
or whatever. This market is considered to have great potential, and those who seek to supply it are 
understandably jealous of their freedom to use words such as “snack” and “break”  without hindrance in 
relation to their goods.’  
21 ibid, 219. 
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…identification by the public and the trade of the particular words “Have A 
Break” with the applicants' products has become so widespread that in recent 
years the applicants' posters have featured these words alone to advertise the 
product. 
In the event, the Assistant Registrar held that in principle slogans were registrable as 
trade marks. 22  He also rejected the argument put forward by Mars that the mark did 
not connect the good with the proprietor because it was merely ‘an exhortation to buy 
the goods.’ Nor did he accept that the mark had, for the same reason, not been used as a 
trade mark. Finally, he did not believe that the registration of HAVE A BREAK would 
‘erode’ - in effect restrict - the freedom of other manufacturers to use the term ‘break’.23  
According to the Assistant Registrar, the mark was inherently distinctive under s10.  It 
was also factually distinctive.  He based this finding of factual distinctiveness on 
evidence including a survey of 500 people conducted by Rowntree, of whom 88% made 
a connection between HAVE A BREAK and Kit Kat.24   He concluded that registration 
could proceed, subject to two conditions: the applicants should file at the registry a form 
amending the application to limit specification of the goods to ‘chocolate biscuits (other 
than biscuits for animals)’; and they should incorporate the disclaimer, ‘Registration of 
this mark shall give no right to the exclusive use of the word “BREAK”’, an exclusion 
which reflected the argument made by Mars that other traders might wish to use the 
word (along with related words such as ’snack’).25  
                                                             
22 In earlier periods, this finding might have been queried in that slogans were generally not registrable 
because the advertising messages they convey are laudatory (and hence descriptive of goods or services). 
By the time of the KitKat proceedings, however, slogans had come to be viewed as registrable in principle 
if the words display no direct reference to the character or quality of the goods and, if they do make such 
reference, potentially still registrable on proof of distinctiveness.  
23 Nestlé, n 17 above, 220. 
24 Indeed he was willing to extrapolate from that that up to 74% of the entire UK population would make 
such a connection (ibid, 222).  Both parties had introduced survey evidence. The Assistant Registrar held 
that the relevant evidence had to relate to the period up to the application in 1976 rather than to the later 
date of the hearing (ibid, 225). 
25 ibid, 223.  According to a Google books Ngram, the word ‘break’ was most widely used in English in the 
second half of the 17th century. But from the 1940s the noun form began to occur increasingly in 
combinations which denoted short periods of relaxation within a day of work or leisure: ‘coffee break’ or 
‘tea break’ (phrases which therefore have the opposite relation to eating by comparison with an older 
food-related kind of break, ‘breakfast’). A meaning of general interruption is attested in the OED from late 
17th century, in the sense of a sudden alteration from a level stride (either walking pace or steps taken by 
a horse) and gradually the word extended metaphorically: a ‘break in our lives’, a ‘break in the sequence 
of events’. The overtone that such a break involved relief or remission also existed from the 19th century, 
as in ‘the run is 5000 miles without a break’. This ‘relief’ sense began to be applied to the structure of the 
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2.2.2 Mars’ appeal 
 Mars then appealed. In 1983 in the High Court (reported in 1993),  Whitford J. 
came to a markedly different conclusion from that of the Assistant Registrar.  Key to this 
divergence was Whitford J’s interpretation of what constituted the public interest in the 
case.   
 Whitford, J began by considering the evidence.  Unlike the Assistant Registrar he 
took the view  that, although the public might associate the words HAVE A BREAK with 
KitKat, this was not the same as the words having acquired a distinctive secondary 
meaning.  He was also less willing than the Assistant Registrar to accept that the term 
HAVE A BREAK had been widely used by KitKat, either on television, posters or 
wrappers prior to 1976.  For related reasons, he discounted the survey evidence which 
had been presented.  Whitford J did however agree that slogans might in principle be 
registered.26   
 He reached two conclusions.  First, unlike the Assistant Registrar he took the 
view that the slogan had not been used as a trade mark prior to the application for 
registration. Rather, it had been used as an advertising slogan.27 Accordingly, opposition 
should succeed under s68 (which identifies which signs may act as a trade mark).  In 
case he should be wrong in making that judgment, however, he went on to consider the 
situation regarding registration in Part B of the Register.  According to Whitford J, the 
words HAVE A BREAK were not inherently distinctive.28  This was because, once ‘break’ 
was disclaimed, leaving ‘have’ and ‘a’, there was nothing distinctive left to protect.  
Furthermore, for Whitford J, the key question for registration in Part B was not 
‘whether there would be a significant erosion of another’s freedom to describe its 
products’, which would be a factual consequence of registration. Rather the question 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
working or institutional day, for example in schools. Other meanings accreted more recently, including in 
1940s media use of the term to indicate programming pauses for adverts as a so-called ‘natural break’. 
26 ibid, 226-227. 
27 While Whitford, J agreed that slogans might in principle be registered despite their promotional 
function, deciding whether registration should be permitted in given circumstances was in effect a matter 
of judging between alternatives: between viewing an expression as merely a laudatory slogan, or viewing 
it as a badge of origin. We discuss the subsequent evolution of approaches to multiple meanings conveyed 
by slogans below, p.xx 
28 The Assistant Registrar in this context had also referred to the then recent House of Lords decision, 
YORK Trade Mark (1982) 1 WLR 195 for the principle that a mark cannot be inherently capable of 
distinguishing if others might wish to use it in the ordinary course of business without improper motive.  
Whitford J took the view that this was not an exhaustive principle (Nestlé, n 17 above, 229). 
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was this:  were these words which another trader might ‘perfectly fairly’ wish to use. If 
this potential or freedom to choose the sign were likely to be restricted, the slogan 
should be debarred from registration as lacking inherent distinctiveness. 29   
 In sum, Whitford J concluded that, whatever the survey evidence, such evidence 
did not show that the public understood the words HAVE A BREAK as a badge of origin 
rather than as a description of goods suitable for consumption at break times.  Instead, 
for Whitford J, HAVE A BREAK remained a descriptive and ‘commonplace phrase’, which 
other traders might legitimately wish to use and should therefore not be registered.30   
 In reaching his decision, Whitford J chose to take account of the larger 
commercial context, including important economic and social changes which, it was 
argued by Mars, had shaped the market for KitKat and like products.  Thus, he accepted 
Mars’ argument, also made before the Assistant Registrar, that one reason other traders 
might wish to use the phrase HAVE A BREAK arose from the fact that there was an 
increasing demand for a ‘snack product’ among consumers.  Mars explained this 
development as deriving ‘in part out of increased affluence and in part out of increased 
mobility, coupled with changes in the role of women which had resulted in an 
increasing demand for snacks.’   According to Whitford, J, ‘these and other factors’ had 
led people to consume snacks in place of ‘formal’ meals during their breaks, ‘whether 
natural or unnatural in their day to day occupations’.    It was for this reason, he 
concluded, that other traders, including Mars, were using the word ‘break’ in their own 
advertising and should be able to continue to do so.31    
 As we have seen, Rowntree’s own advertising sought to exploit such social 
change and its effect on the ‘snack’ market when it introduced its slogan ‘Have a Break’. 
But that adoption of the slogan had taken place some twenty years before the 
application to register it.  Perhaps, given the example of the 1950s television advert 
                                                             
29He also disagreed with the Assistant Registrar’s conclusion that allowing the registration of the phrase 
‘would not bring about a significant erosion of a manufacturer’s freedom to point out the aptness of his 
product for consumption during breaks’, although he believed this was the wrong question to ask (ibid, 
230). 
30 The evidence put forward, in the view of Whitford, J, did not overcome ‘the inherent descriptiveness 
and suitability of a commonplace phrase, if I may so describe it, such as this for the purposes of 
advertisement of this or indeed a vast variety of other goods..’ (ibid, 230-231).  Whitford, J’s choice of the 
word ‘commonplace’ merges three characteristics whose absence is salient in discussion of, but not 
sufficient to preclude, distinctiveness: lack of verbal invention, frequency of use in descriptive rather than 
trade mark settings; and topicality linked to likely demand for use by others.  
31 ibid, 224. 
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featuring the housewife with her ‘secret treasure’, but also with her state-of-the-art 
kitchen and middle-class accent, the marketing intention at that time had been to 
present Kit Kat as aspirational rather than reflective of an already existing market for 
breaks with snacks.  Certainly the historical moment was a transitional one: the TV 
commercial form was itself a novelty, coincidentally adding a new meaning to the word 
‘break’ attested from around that time: not only some kind of pause in or remission 
from physical activity – a meaning no doubt heightened in affect by wartime - but now 
‘break’ as an intermission for commercials while watching television. At that earlier, 
post-war historical moment, the slogan might have been calculated to allude to the 
notion that in peacetime it was legitimate to take a break, while in wartime Kit Kats 
were, according to Rowntree’s slogan of that period, ’What active people need’.  The 
imperative form of ‘Have a break’, in this context, was also on a historical cusp, as in 
many fields hierarchically directed permission to break began to coexist more with self-
directed patterns of work allowing freedom to interrupt and relax not previously so 
widely possible either in wartime or in earlier and many persisting forms of 
employment. It may also be significant that, at the time the slogan was adopted, wartime 
rationing was just coming to an end; so eating a Kit Kat may well have constituted a 
special ‘treat’ to an extent that was no longer the case by the time the litigation 
concluded.32 
 Whatever the earlier connotations of the particular words HAVE A BREAK, which 
must inevitably have been heavily inflected by the experience of wartime society and its 
aftermath, it is in fact the case that ‘snacking’ during ‘breaks’ had been a commonplace 
activity in most affluent countries and among all classes, both at work and home, for 
many decades before the 1970s.  Such snacking had of course involved   varying 
foodstuffs chosen for reasons linked to income and class, regional identity, and social 
aspiration.  The popularity of a variety of ‘snack foods’ from the early twentieth century 
attests to the existence of such behaviour, as do the high sales over a prolonged period 
of Kit Kats as well as of Mars bars (whose famous slogan also evokes a contrast between 
work and breaks:  ‘a Mars a day helps you work, rest and play’).  It was precisely for that 
                                                             
32On wartime rationing and on changing gender roles see, K. W. Rothschild, ‘Rationing and the Consumer’ 
(March, 1945) No. 7 Oxford Economic Papers 67-82;  S. Bruley, ‘A Very Happy Crowd’: Women in Industry 
in South London in World War Two’ (Autumn, 1997), History Workshop Journal, 58-76;  A. Adolph, 
‘Austerity, Consumption, and Postwar Gender Disruption in Mollie Panter-Downes’s’One Fine day”’ 
(Summer, 2008) Vol. 31, No. 4 Journal of Modern Literature 18-35. 
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reason that, by the 1970s, HAVE A BREAK was an exemplary marketing slogan. Of 
course, based on the same reasoning, it was important for Mars to establish that the 
same or closely related wording was something other traders would wish to employ. 
Furthermore, while the word ‘break’ had come into increased use during the 1950s, by 
the 1970s the word was being applied not only to time taken out to rest or consume 
food but increasingly to other planned interruptions to routine that had become more 
widely available, such as commercial holiday ‘breaks’.33  Perhaps it was the spread of 
these more substantial breaks, and their associated advertising, which drew particular 
attention to the increasing consumer affluence noted by the court, but also ratcheted up 
the question of under what conditions such a word should be permitted as a proprietary 
term. 
2.2.3 Battle rejoined, 1995 
 In 1995, although the longer slogan HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT had been 
successfully registered by Rowntree Mackintosh since 1983, the company had not given 
up its desire to register HAVE A BREAK on its own, separate from any combined 
reference to the product name.  A further application was lodged with the Registry. 
Mars renewed its opposition and an opposition hearing took place in 2002.34   In the 
meantime, however, Rowntree Mackintosh had (in 1988) been acquired by Nestlé. So it 
was now Nestlé who were seeking to register HAVE A BREAK for the same goods.  The 
bases of opposition submitted by Mars, now under the terms of the 1994 Trade Marks 
Act, were remarkably similar to those it had presented in 1982 for consideration under 
the earlier, 1938 Act.   
 As previously, Mars asserted that the slogan was incapable of distinguishing, that 
it lacked distinctiveness, was descriptive, and was an indication customary in the 
trade.35  However, in this hearing there was a crucial difference.  Unlike under the 1938 
                                                             
33 Use of the word ‘break’ to denote commercial holiday packages dates from the mid-1960s, in such 
combinations as ‘city break’, ‘holiday break’, ‘weekend break’, ‘midwinter break’, and ‘bargain break’.  
34 IN THE MATTER OF Application No 2015684 by Société des Produits Nestlé S.A. to register a trade 
mark in Class 30.  Although the application was made in 1995, opposition was not heard until 2002. 
35TMA Sections 3(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d).  Mr Ronald (Managing Director of the snack foods division of 
Mars) observed that ‘the word BREAK is highly suitable and obvious for use in the snack market because 
it describes both when a snack food can be eaten and why it should be eaten.’ Although the idea of a short 
interruption for relaxation within an otherwise busy task or occupation was not descriptive of the class of 
physical chocolate products, it appears both to describe – and in Mr Ronald’s words, explain - their use, 
potential use, and function (ibid at [26]). This point had been identified in the earlier hearing by Whitford 
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Act, a sign could no longer be denied registration because it was one that other traders 
might legitimately wish to use.36  Once a mark had acquired distinctiveness through use, 
it could be registered. Thus Mars also argued, contra Nestlé, that the slogan had not 
acquired distinctiveness through use.  
 As with the previous application, Nestlé tendered evidence that HAVE A BREAK 
had been widely used in advertising, although once again almost all of that use had been 
either as part of the slogan HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT or in immediate 
juxtaposition with the word ‘KitKat’. The strongest example of independent use of the 
phrase HAVE A BREAK was that, in 1995, Nestlé had run a television advertisement in 
which the phrase HAVE A BREAK, rather than the longer slogan, had been used at the 
top of the screen. Even then, however, the Kit Kat logo also appeared at the bottom of 
the screen.   
 Nestlé resubmitted some survey evidence from the earlier 1982 hearing 
intended to test public reaction to the use of HAVE A BREAK as a brand name for 
confectionery. That evidence had now been distilled into a smaller number of statutory 
declarations. However, the company also produced fresh survey evidence.37  The 
Hearing Officer nevertheless found the surveys unconvincing. His view was that most 
respondents were only ‘reminded’ of a KitKat when presented with the phrase HAVE A 
BREAK by ‘spontaneously associating’ the term with KITKAT.  None of the survey 
informants, for example, was recorded as having said that a product design shown to 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
J, but not accepted, when he commented on the Assistant Registrar’s view that the descriptive aspect of 
the phrase (whether it made direct reference to the character or quality of the goods) was not sufficient 
to interfere with its distinctive function. Evidence was also presented by a Mr Brand, a trade mark 
attorney, examining use of the phrase HAVE A BREAK, and the word BREAK, in press articles during the 
period 1990 to 1998. Nestlé also cited examples showing the word BREAK associated with other 
chocolate confections: Fox’s Twin Breaks, St Michael’s Break In, Nestlé’s own Breakaway, Cadbury’s 
Chocolate Break (drinking chocolate), Tesco Break 2, Waitrose’s Wafer Break and T-Break, Caxton’s 
Break Bars, Morrison’s Break and Bobby Break 4. Some examples showed the word used in slogans on the 
packaging of products: one Cadbury’s Time out confection was described as ‘The wafer break with a layer 
of Flake’; and the opponent’s own Twix chocolate biscuit carried the slogan, ‘A break from the norm’ (ibid 
at [30-31]). 
36 Art 3(3) TM Directive.  See for example, the CJEU decision in Windsurfing Chiemsee Produktions-und 
Vertriebs GmbH v Boots-und Segelzubehor Walter Huber (Case C-108/97) [1999] ECR I-2779. Some 
exceptions exist, including functional shapes and signs which offend against public morality.   See C. 
Geilen, ‘European Community: trade marks - protection of geographical indication as a trade mark’ 
(1999) EIPR N182.  It is true that, in Windsurfing and later cases, the CJEU recognised that there might be 
a public interest in not registering signs which were descriptive so they might be used by other traders.  
See for example M. Blakeney, “The Registration of geographical trade marks in Europe” [2014] Int. T.L.R. 
1.  However, it was also made clear in Windsurfing that once such signs had acquired distinctiveness they 
could be registered.  
37In the matter of Nestlé’s Trade Mark Application, n 33 above at [18-20]. 
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them bearing the slogan HAVE A BREAK actually was a KitKat. The surveys did not 
demonstrate that a significant number of respondents believed that a chocolate bar 
labeled HAVE A BREAK came from the makers of KitKat.38 
 For this and other reasons, the Hearing Officer refused the application.  He did 
not find the mark customary in the trade (because it did not consist ‘exclusively’ of signs 
or indications which have become customary (under s3(1)(d)). Nor did he find it 
descriptive under s3(1)(c), as being no different from the usual way of designating the 
relevant goods or services or their characteristics. On applying the test of 
distinctiveness independently under s3(1)(b), however, he did find that the slogan 
lacked distinctiveness, affirming in paragraph 58 the principle that: ‘The fact that a 
phrase is not a normal means of designating the goods or their characteristics does not 
necessarily mean that the phrase has any inherent trade mark character.’ 
  Despite difficulties in ascertaining precisely how the slogan could be shown to 
function as an indicator of origin, the Hearing Officer held that consumers would view 
HAVE A BREAK as ‘an origin neutral invitation to consume a snack when used in the 
course of promoting a snack food product.’ In much the same way, he suggested, an 
‘exhortation to have a day in the country’ would be seen as a ‘promotional statement’ in 
the promotion of picnic hampers.39  The Hearing Officer concluded that the expression 
HAVE A BREAK, insofar as it had been used on its own, had not in any case acquired 
distinctiveness through use:  to the extent that consumers connected HAVE A BREAK to 
KitKat, this was only the case when the former was used with the latter.40   
2.2.4 Nestlé appeal to the High Court 
 Nestlé appealed against this decision to the High Court.41  At the hearing in 
December 2002, Rimer J held that the Hearing Officer had been correct to assess the 
distinctiveness of the slogan with reference to the reaction of the average consumer 
assuming normal and fair use in advertising the goods and on the packaging, and to find 
that the expression would be understood simply as a neutral invitation to consume a 
                                                             
38 Ibid at [74]. 
39 ibid at [74]. 
40 ibid at [84]. 
41 Nestlé SA’s Trade Mark Application [2002] EWHC 2533 (Ch). 
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snack rather than fostering an expectation that the goods originated from a particular 
undertaking.42 
 At the trial, and in an echo of the previous dispute in the 1970s, Mars argued on 
the basis of survey evidence that the average consumer for KitKats was the general 
public, not all of whom would of course consume KitKats. This argument suggests that, 
for such a wider public, the slogan’s imperative form served the purpose of encouraging 
them to consume.  For its part, Nestlé took issue with the view that the average 
consumer for KitKats was the general public, as had been accepted by the Hearing 
Officer.  Instead, counsel for Nestlé argued that some individuals did consume snacks, 
some were on a diet and ate nothing, some never took breaks and some were retired.43 
As a result, Nestlé submitted, the average consumer for the goods in question was a 
more limited category than the Hearing Officer had supposed, and that those who did 
snack would be more likely to see HAVE A BREAK as a badge of origin. 44  For Mars, the 
broader the category of the average consumer, the less likely such a consumer could be 
assumed to see the slogan as a badge of origin.  For Nestlé, by contrast, if the category 
were confined to those who do take breaks, the more likely such a consumer would be 
to consume KitKats and so to differentiate products in that market sector.  For Nestlé, 
however, it was still important to argue that the category was sufficiently numerous to 
ensure that HAVE A BREAK was functioning as a badge of origin and was not primarily 
descriptive.  
 In addition, Nestlé argued that recent case law of the CJEU, in particular the 
BABY-DRY decision, supported its position. That decision had confirmed that a mark 
which is held not to be descriptive so as to be disqualified under s3(1)(c) TMA 1994  
would automatically be considered to be distinctive and hence not disqualified under 
s3(1)(b).45 The BABY-DRY case concerned an attempt by Procter & Gamble to register 
the term for nappies.  According to the CJEU, the word combination BABY-DRY was not 
descriptive of the product, and neither was it the usual way of referring to the function 
                                                             
42 ibid at [10]. 
43 ibid at [11]. 
44 See J. Davis, ‘Locating the average consumer: his judicial origins, intellectual influences and current role 
in European trade mark law’ (2005) 2 IPQ 183. 
45Nestlé SA’s Trade Mark Application, n 39 above at [44].  See Procter & Gamble Co v OHIM (C383/99P) 
‘Baby-Dry’ [2002] ECR I-6251. ‘Baby Dry’ had not been decided at the time of the opposition hearing in 
the Registry.   
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of baby’s nappies.46 Rather, it was a ‘lexical invention’ which gave the mark distinctive 
power; so it could be registered.   
  Rimer J, however, distinguished the decision in BABY-DRY from the present 
dispute (as had the Hearing Officer). According to Rimer J, no issue relating to s3(1)(b), 
concerning lack of distinctiveness, had actually arisen in the BABY-DRY case. Rather, 
that case had been solely concerned with whether the words were descriptive.  He also 
noted that in BABY-DRY the question of whether the mark was registrable was not 
difficult to answer, since the verbal device did involve a degree of verbal 
inventiveness.47  Rimer J’s conclusion following BABY-DRY was that first it was 
necessary to look to see whether HAVE A BREAK was referable to the relevant goods or 
representative of their essential characteristics.  If the answer was in the negative, 
however, it did not follow that the mark had the necessary character of distinctiveness 
to be registrable.  The second did not automatically follow from the first.  Rimer J 
concluded on this basis that the Hearing Officer had been correct to query whether 
slogans should be treated differently from other marks and that he had also been right 
to conclude that it might be more difficult for the average consumer to view a slogan as 
a badge of origin, unlike for example logos and figurative marks.  Finally, since the 
Hearing Officer had concluded that HAVE A BREAK was not sufficiently distinctive to be 
registered on the basis of the facts, this was not a conclusion which the court could 
overturn.48 
  Turning to acquired distinctiveness, Rimer J. went on to endorse the Hearing 
Officer’s findings both in law and on the facts.  He did not think that, through prior use, 
the sign had come to be seen by consumers as constituting a badge of origin.’49  This 
view was taken in large measure because the sign HAVE A BREAK had been used as an 
independent mark only to a minimal extent. He referred to the proviso in s3(1) 
concerned with acquired distinctiveness, especially the wording that registration of a 
                                                             
46 Procter & Gamble v OHIM, n 43 above at [39]-[42].  Googling the two words ‘baby’ and ‘dry’ for adjacent 
use (i.e. A followed immediately by B) results first in nominal, proprietary uses (Baby Dry, Baby-Dry) 
alongside sponsored and other modifying search-term uses including  ‘baby dry scalp’, ‘new-born baby 
dry skin’, ‘baby dry cough’, and ‘baby dry rash’. Other collocations only occur as resulting from particular 
grammatical constructions, as in ‘keep your baby dry’, 
47 Nestlé SA’s Trade Mark Application, n 39 above at [20]. 
48ibid at [22]. 
49 ibid at [32]. Rimer J also noted that it was true that consumers might associate the slogan with Kit Kat 
but mere association was not sufficient to demonstrate acquired distinctiveness. 
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submitted trade mark should not be refused ‘if, before the date of application for 
registration it has in fact acquired a distinctive character as a result of the use made of 
it.’ This wording, he stated, required that Nestlé show that the use of HAVE A BREAK 
had resulted in its acquisition of such character, even though the company had only 
made minimal independent use of that mark, generally using it as part of its trade mark 
HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT. Consumers might associate HAVE A BREAK with 
KITKAT, but this was insufficient to show they viewed the phrase as a badge of origin.50   
 Relatedly, Rimer J also accepted the Hearing Officer’s view that the survey 
evidence was flawed, commenting that he regarded ‘the survey exercise as having been 
somewhat pointless’.51  In particular, he suggested, interviewees were not being asked 
the relevant question: whether the company’s use of the phrase HAVE A BREAK in 
connection with relevant products showed that they derive from a particular origin. 
Rather, they had in effect been asked a wider question: what the slogan HAVE A BREAK 
meant to them in connection with confectionery. While hearing the phrase HAVE A 
BREAK might have triggered for consumers ‘an association between slogan and KitKat’, 
possibly making them think that a HAVE A BREAK product, or picture of a product, 
presented to them came from the makers of KitKat, this was because the phrase was 
typically used as part of the phrase, HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT, and that the latter 
phrase was a very familiar one.  Conversely, there had been very little use of HAVE A 
BREAK on its own.  Rimer J rejected the application. 
2.2.5 Nestlé’s second appeal (Court of Appeal)   
 With the permission of Aldous, LJ on the ground that it would be appropriate for 
the Court of Appeal to consider the issue of registrability of phrases such as HAVE A 
BREAK, Nestlé appealed again.52 In the CA, the Vice Chancellor (Sir Andrew Morritt), 
Mummery, LJ and Sedley LJ confirmed that both the Hearing Officer and Rimer J had 
taken the correct approach to assessing whether the slogan was inherently distinctive 
ab initio. 
                                                             
50 ibid at [32].   Or other phrasings associated with the research, which were referenced in the judgment, 
included  ‘create the impression’, ‘make a connection between’, ‘attributed to’, ‘associated with’, 
‘reminded of’, ‘unavoidably referring to’, ‘brings to mind’. 
51 ibid at [32]. 
52 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Mars UK Ltd, n 13 above.  
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 In his detailed judgment, Sir Andrew Morritt VC began by setting out the 
arguments related to inherent distinctiveness . He referred to BABY-DRY, as well as to 
two other European decisions, Daimler Chrysler v OHIM (2003) and Linde AG v Rado 
Uhren (2003).53 Both these latter cases concerned the requirements of Art. 3(1)(b) and 
had been decided after the High Court judgment.  The V-C concluded that, as a general 
rule and in light of these decisions, the distinctiveness threshold for registration is that a 
sign identifies a product as originating from a particular undertaking, such that ‘if the 
mark for which registration is sought is distinctive in the relevant sense to any extent 
then its registration is not precluded by s.3(1)(b).’54  ‘Not precluded’, however, differed 
from being warranted by or necessarily leading to. Somewhat ambiguously, but 
appearing to emphasize that distinctiveness requires characteristics which go beyond 
the basic contrastive potential of linguistic signs, the V-C went on to observe that,  
‘Individual words and letters are used as inherently distinctive of other words or letters 
but this does not make them registrable as trade marks.’55 Overall, the V-C took the view 
that both Rimer J and the Hearing Office had in their decisions ‘correctly anticipated’ the 
judgments in Daimler Chrysler  and Linde; he agreed that the slogan should not be 
registered unless Nestlé could show acquired distinctiveness.56  
 On the topic of distinctiveness acquired through use, the V-C believed the law 
was unclear.   In particular he addressed an issue which had originally been raised by 
the Hearing Officer, who had pointed out that Nestlé had been able to produce only 
minimal evidence to show that HAVE A BREAK had been used as an independent mark.  
Instead, the most Nestlé could establish was that HAVE A BREAK ‘falls within the 
penumbra of the protection afforded to the (already registered) trade mark HAVE A 
BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT.’ In making this point, the Hearing Officer was referring (at 
paras 102-103) to the fact that falling within a ‘penumbra’ of protection conferred by a 
registered sign has different consequences from being part of that sign’s main ‘umbra’. 
This is because, once a mark is registered, the proprietor receives an exclusive right to 
use it in respect of the goods for which it is registered.  Specifically, he pointed out, ‘in 
the case of an identical mark, the proprietor has an absolute right to prevent 
                                                             
53 Daimler Chrysler Corpn v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market ( Case T-128/01) [2003]  ECR 
II-731 and Linde AG v Deutsches Patent und Markenant ( Cases C-53/01 and C-54/01) [2003] ECR I-3161. 
54 n 13 at [23]. 
55 ibid at [23]. 
56 ibid at [24]. 
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unauthorised registration or use of the mark by third parties, without having to 
establish likelihood of confusion (s5 (1) and 10 (1). This is the ‘umbra’ of protection 
afforded by registration’.57  However, under ss5 (2), 5 (3), 10 (2) and 10 (3) a further 
penumbra of protection is defined, ‘which extends to use and registration of similar 
rather than identical marks and goods, but only where there exists a likelihood of 
confusion and in some situations extends also to dissimilar goods’.58  The Hearing 
Officer did not believe that a penumbra effect conferred by the longer slogan provided 
sufficient basis to justify registering HAVE A BREAK on its own, since to do so would 
create a new umbra, and therefore a further, new penumbra, of protection for this 
second mark still in the absence of any real independent use of it.  
 For his part, the V-C noted that ‘dangers of the progressive umbrae and 
penumbra’ of protection had been raised in other English cases.59  Nevertheless, 
according to Nestlé, to endorse the supposed dangers of the umbra/penumbra 
approach might itself be a dangerous route to take.  For example, it might exclude 
shapes from possible registration, since shape marks are mostly used together with 
other marks such as words or images on products, and so arguably take their effect 
from that association.   
  Nestlé had further contended that the approach of preventing the danger of 
creating a chain of new umbrae and their related penumbrae by not registering a sign 
was not supported by any decision of any court of the European Union.  Indeed, Nestlé 
argued that the Board of Appeal had taken the opposite approach in  Ringling Bros—
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc.60 In that case, the applicant had sought to register 
THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH as a CTM, where previously it had been used together 
with the registered mark BARNUM & BAILEY. Although the Board of Appeal rejected the 
application, as the mark lacked distinctiveness, it nonetheless accepted that there was 
some support for the view that it had acquired distinctiveness through long use along 
with the applicant’s registered mark.  In a key passage cited by counsel for Nestlé, the 
                                                             
57 Nestlé Trade Mark Application, n 33 above at [102].  
58 ibid at [103]. 
59 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Mars UK Ltd n 13 above at [28].  Most notably  in Thomson Holidays Ltd v 
Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 1828 at [29]and  Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Unilever plc 
[2002] EWHC 2709 (Ch) at [32].  
60Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows Inc (Case R 111/200-2) 23 May 2001. 
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Board of Appeal stated that61:   
The contention of the examiner that because the words THE GREATEST SHOW 
ON EARTH have always appeared alongside the appellant's registered trade 
mark, the sign is not likely to be considered as evidence of trade mark use is not 
in the Board's view a valid one. The Board can well understand that a slogan-like 
phrase associated with a trade mark, like in this case, might by repetition over 
time, create a separate and independent impression. 
 
 The V-C then summed up (at para 31-32) the arguments for both parties.  For 
Nestlé, the contention was that use of the sign leading to acquired distinctiveness did 
not always mean that such use must be ‘separate and distinct’ from any other mark. 
Mars argued, on the contrary, that only use of the slogan on its own would be relevant 
to acquisition of distinctiveness, since only then would such use be genuinely use as a 
trade mark.  For the V-C it was significant that, in the case of THE GREATEST SHOW ON 
EARTH, the slogan in question had apparently always been used in conjunction with the 
applicant’s registered trade mark and yet the Board of Appeal had still suggested it 
could potentially acquire distinctiveness.  Conversely, the Hearing Officer and Rimer J 
had both based their findings on an assumption that the mark for which registration 
was sought must be used separately from the registered mark to acquire 
distinctiveness.62  The question therefore arose:  which of these assumptions was 
correct. The Court of Appeal decided to submit the following question to the CJEU as a 
reference for a preliminary ruling:    
  
Whether the distinctive character of a mark referred to in Art.3(3) of Council 
Directive 89/104 and Art.7(3) of Council Regulation 40/94 may be acquired 
following or in consequence of the use of that mark as part of or in conjunction 
with another mark?  
 In doing so, however, the court raised other issues. Mummery LJ noted his 
disagreement for example with Nestlé’s suggestion that the 1994 Act, in implementing 
the Directive, had led to what Mummery LJ referred to as ‘the alleged generous new 
                                                             
61ibid at [19]. 
62 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Mars, n 13 above at [31]-[32]. 
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policy of registering combinations of ordinary English words as long as they are not 
descriptive of the characteristics of the goods to which they are to be applied’.63  The 
implication of this suggestion, for Nestlé, was that such a new policy would result in a 
different decision on the registrability of HAVE A BREAK than had been Whitford J’s in 
1983 (as well as, by implication, as regards other slogans in the future). While 
Mummery LJ agreed that it would be wrong, when interpreting and applying the 1994 
Act, simply to follow decisions of the English courts based on the 1938 Act, he 
nonetheless believed that no such change of policy could be identified in the numerous 
preambles to the Directive.  Rather, he stated that the only sure guide to legislative 
policy should be the structure and content of the Directive’s detailed provisions.64 
 For Sedley LJ, concurring as regards referral of the question to the CJEU, 
whatever answer was given to that question he did not believe the slogan should be 
registered.  He noted that, as we have described above, the whole phrase HAVE A 
BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT incorporates a pun on the word ‘break’, which is ‘lost when the 
phrase is severed’.  His response was unsympathetic:65 
The endeavour to appropriate the use of the first three words seems to me to 
involve forfeiting the very element of combination and of double-entendre on 
which the claim to acquired distinctiveness is built. To use another colloquial 
English phrase, Nestlé want the penny and the bun.   
Nor did Sedley LJ agree with the contention of counsel for Nestlé that, while the 1938 
Act might have allowed the court to refuse registration to marks which would 
monopolise ordinary words and phrases, this was no longer the case under the 
Directive, or that, under the Directive, there was no bar to registering such marks 
because the Directive provided a defence of descriptive use under s11(2) (an argument 
which many commentators believed followed from the Baby-Dry decision). 66 Rather, 
Sedley LJ cited Advocate General Jacobs’ reference to the much earlier dictum of Cozens-
Hardy, MR in Perfection: Joseph Crosfield and Sons’ application, that, ‘Wealthy traders are 
habitually eager to enclose parts of the great common of the English language and to 
                                                             
63 ibid at [42]. 
64 ibid at [42]. 
65 ibid at [49] 
66 ibid at [47].  See for example, A. Griffiths, ‘Modernising trade mark law and promoting economic 
efficiency: an evaluation of the Baby Dry judgment and its aftermath’ (2003) 1 IPQ 1.  
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exclude the general public of the present day and of the future from access to the 
enclosure.’67 And he expressed the view, like Mummery LJ, that no such policy change 
had been recognized in the Directive and indeed ‘that the metaphor remains relevant to 
the modern regime of European trade marks.’68 
2.2.6 The CJEU judgment 
 In the Court of Appeal, then, Sedley LJ took the view that by seeking to register 
HAVE A BREAK Nestlé had overreached itself.  He also believed, with Mummery LJ, that 
Nestlé’s success would involve a change of policy in relation to trade mark registration 
that had not been envisaged by the Directive.  His views do not appear to have been 
shared either AG Kokott or by the CJEU in 2005, however, and indeed the CJEU made no 
allusion to policy in its judgment.69   
 In its relatively short judgment – which in its narrative of the proceedings 
truncates the application history so that it starts with the fresh application made in 
1995, i.e. after changes brought about by TMA1994 – the Court first confirmed that 
distinctive character, whether inherent or acquired, must be assessed in relation to the 
goods or services in respect of which registration is applied for based on the presumed 
expectations of an average consumer for those goods.70  Then, looking specifically at 
distinctiveness acquired through use, it held that such use refers ‘solely to use of the 
mark for the purpose of identification, by the relevant class of consumers of the goods 
or services in question, as originating from a single undertaking’.71   It went on to hold   
that ‘acquisition of distinctive character may be as a result both of the use, as part of a 
registered trade mark, of a component thereof and of the use of a separate mark in 
conjunction with a registered trade mark.’72 
                                                             
67 Perfection: Joseph Crosfield and Sons' application (1909) 26 R.P.C. 837 at [854].  For a discussion of the 
attitude of successive trade mark regimes to the enclosure of the language common see, J. Davis, 
‘European Trade Mark Law and the Enclosure of the Commons’ (2002) 4 IPQ 342. 
68 Société des Produits Nestlé SA v Mars, n 13 above at [47]. 
69 Case C-353/03 Société des produits Nestlé v Mars UK Ltd [2005] ECR I-6135.  
70 ibid at [25].  The average consumer is assumed to be reasonably well-informed, observant and 
circumspect.  See Davis, ‘Locating the average consumer’, p. 186.  See for example, Lloyd Schuhfabrik 
Meyer v Klijsen Handel BV [1999] ECR I-3819 at para 26. 
71Société des produits Nestlé v Mars, n 67 above at [29]. 
72 ibid at [30]. 
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 Interestingly, the Advocate General had earlier taken a more detailed view of the 
arguments relating to the dangers of creating a penumbra of protection, which had been 
raised by the Court of Appeal.    Referring to what he described as the United Kingdom 
government’s ‘fear’ of the ‘risk’ of ‘an unjustified extension of the protection of the 
principal mark’, the AG argued that such fear is based on ‘the consideration that parts of 
the mark do not acquire distinctive character on their own but derive it only from the 
distinctive character of the principal mark’ as well as on a related concern that a 
‘process of extension’ of the mark ‘could therefore be continued ad infinitum.’73  
However, he considered such a fear illusory. While strong principal marks might 
transfer distinctive character to elements of a complex sign, the derivative marks would 
be less capable of transmitting the same degree of distinctiveness to further subsidiary 
derivative marks, since the derivative mark would itself be less well-known. The result 
of successive extensions of a mark, he suggested, would be marks at some point no 
longer showing any inherent distinctive character except as an element of the principal 
mark.74   The AG went on that the full implications of this ‘extension’ argument, in 
relation to HAVE A BREAK, were not for the CJEU to determine.  While use of a word 
sequence as part of a word mark could therefore, ‘as a matter of principle’ lead to that 
word sequence acquiring the requisite distinctive character sufficient to be registrable 
as a trade mark, it would be necessary to show that the relevant consumer groups 
understood it to be a badge of origin.75 
 Similarly, in its judgment, the CJEU emphasized that to prove that distinctive 
character had been acquired through use would require assessment of those matters 
demonstrating distinctiveness set out in Windsurfing.76 Such factors include not only the 
market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-
standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in 
promoting the mark; and statements from Chambers of Commerce and Industry or 
other trade and professional associations. The Windsurfing criteria also include the 
                                                             
73 ibid at [AG34]. 
74 ibid at [35]-[36]. 
75 ibid at [46]. 
76 ibid at [30]-[31].   
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proportion of the relevant class of persons who, because of the mark, identify goods as 
originating from a particular undertaking.77     
3.1 The legacy of Nestlé’s triumph over Mars  
 Following clarification by the CJEU in 2005 of the question referred to it by the 
Court of Appeal, opposition by Mars to registration of HAVE A BREAK was withdrawn in 
July 2006. In consequence, there was no further forum in which the acquired 
distinctiveness of HAVE A BREAK, used independently of the longer slogan, would be 
examined.  In the absence of further opposition, HAVE A BREAK was registered in the 
UK (as UK00002015684). The phrase was also registered in August 2007 as a 
Community Trade Mark (CTM EU002726925). So in the end it was Nestlé (and its 
predecessor Rowntree Mackintosh) which had triumphed over Mars.78  The long-term 
implications of aspects the Nestlé decision as regards registration of slogans are well 
illustrated by three more recent cases: Specsavers International, Colloseum Holding and 
Smart Technologies. 
 In Specsavers,79 the question of use as a trade mark in relation to signs presented 
in combination was examined further. The marks at issue were the word mark 
’Specsavers’, a device of two intersecting shaded ellipses with the word ’Specsavers’, 
and two marks of two intersecting ellipses without text, one with shading and one 
without.  These marks had been registered by Specsavers, the largest chain of opticians 
in the UK, for, inter alia, optical appliances.   In 2009, Asda, the supermarket chain and 
                                                             
77 See Windsurfing, n 81 at [49] and [51]. 
78 It is worth noting, in relation to this narrative, that after another lengthy battle Nestlé succeeded in 
2012 in retaining its registration for the shape of its chocolate bar as a CTM in the face of an application 
for its cancellation, this time from Cadbury (who had, like Mars, once objected to HAVE A BREAK but, 
unlike Mars, had withdrawn their opposition prior to the first registry hearing). Case R 513/2011-2 
Société des produits Nestlé S.A. v Cadbury Holdings Ltd Second Board Of Appeal, OHIM [2013] E.T.M.R. 25.  
Nestlé had applied successfully to register the shape as a CTM in 2002.  Cadbury sought to have the mark 
declared invalid.  In its decision the Second Board of Appeal ruled that, although the mark initially lacked 
distinctiveness under art 7(1)(b) of the TM Regulations, the shape had acquired distinctiveness through 
use.  Nestlé had another, albeit limited, victory over Cadbury in the same year when it was able to limit 
Cadbury’s application to register the colour purple for milk chocolate, but not white and dark chocolate 
goods, on the basis that the colour mark lacked distinctiveness for the latter. Société des produits Nestlé SA 
v Cadbury UK  [2012] EWHC 2637 (Ch).]   Ironically, Nestlé was able successfully to contest an accusation 
that the joined-fingers shape of the KitKat was purely functional (providing a means of breaking off 
sections of the bar, as with squares of chocolate), and hence not registrable (under art 7(1)(e)(ii). It 
managed this even though it could be argued that the meaning of its slogan HAVE A BREAK, which for 
Sedley, LJ appeared to depend on evoking not only an interruption of the working day but also a snapping 
of the chocolate sticks themselves, had been relied on in other settings to point in the opposite direction. 
79 See Specsavers v Asda Stores at n 6 above. 
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Specsavers’ main competitor, launched an advertising campaign featuring the slogan, 
’Be a real spec saver at Asda’ and ’Spec savings at Asda’ and two non-intersecting 
ellipses.  Specsavers alleged trade mark infringement and Asda counterclaimed that the 
unshaded ellipse without the text should be revoked for non-use. 
 In the High Court, it was held that Asda had not infringed Specsavers’ trade 
marks and the wordless logo should be revoked for non-use.80  Specsavers appealed.  
The Court of Appeal found that Specsavers’ marks and its logo had been infringed by 
Asda’s slogan and use of the ellipses.  However, it took the view that questions needed 
to be addressed to the EU regarding the wordless mark.  Among these was the question 
whether, where a trader has separate CTM registrations for a graphic device and for a 
word mark and uses the two together, this amounts to use of the figurative mark when 
the figurative mark has not been used on its own? If so, how should the court assess 
such use?  In particular, the CA asked if the answer depends on whether the average 
consumer perceives the two marks as being separate signs or, alternatively, perceives 
each as being distinctive in its own right and having a separate role.81  In other words, 
the key issue for the CJEU in this case was whether the use of the ellipses together with 
the word ‘Specsavers’ constituted genuine use of the wordless CTM, on its own.  While 
this case differed from Nestlé, in that both the slogan and the figurative mark had been 
registered, nonetheless the Court found its answer in the Nestlé decision.  Thus the CJEU 
held:82 
The distinctive character of a registered trade mark may be the result both of the 
use, as part of a registered trade mark, of a component thereof and of the use of a 
separate mark in conjunction with a registered trade mark. In both cases, it is 
sufficient that, in consequence of such use, the relevant class of persons actually 
perceive the product or service at issue as originating from a given undertaking 
(see, by analogy, Nestlé (C-353/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-6135 , at [30]). 
It went on to conclude that the use of the wordless logo mark with the superimposed 
word ‘Specsavers’, whether the latter is used as part of the registered mark or in 
                                                             
80Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd v Asda Stores Ltd [2010] EWHC 2035 (Ch) 
81 Specsavers International Healthcare Ltd v Asda Stores Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 24 
82 Specsavers,, n. 6 above at [23]. 
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conjunction with it, is genuine use for the purpose of Arts. 15(1)(a). 83  
 The second case, Colloseum addressed similar concerns.84  The claimant, Levi 
Strauss, had three trade marks registered for trousers.  The first was the word ’LEVI’S’.  
The second (known as Mark No. 3) was a combination word and figurative mark, with 
the word ’LEVI’S’ inside a rectangular red label which was placed on the rear pockets of 
its jeans.  The third mark, known as mark No. 6, was a plain red rectangle also placed on 
the rear pocket.  Levi claimed that this latter mark had acquired distinctiveness through 
use.  Colloseum marketed jeans with a similar rectangular red label on its rear pockets 
but with a different word mark.  Levi Strauss sued for trade mark infringement in the 
German courts and initially succeeded.  However, Colloseum raised the issue of whether 
there had been genuine use of mark No. 6 under art 15(1) CTM Reg.   It based this 
appeal on the fact that Levi had only used mark No. 6 in the form of mark No. 3.  The 
German court put two questions concerning the interpretation of art 15(1) which the 
CJEU considered together.  These were first whether ‘when a trade mark which is part 
of a composite mark and has become distinctive only as a result of the use of the 
composite mark can be used in such a way as to preserve the rights attached to it if the 
composite mark alone is used?’ And the second was whether, ‘a trade mark is being 
used in such a way as to preserve the rights attached to it if it is used only together with 
another mark, the public sees independent signs in the two marks and, in addition, both 
marks are registered together as a trade mark?’85 
 Once again, the CJEU cited Nestlé to the effect that acquisition of a distinctive 
character can result both from use of one component of a registered mark and also from 
its use as a separate mark in conjunction with the registered mark, so long as the 
relevant consumers see the goods and services to which they attach originating from a 
particular undertaking.86  It followed that the decision in Nestlé should also be applied 
to the question of whether a trade mark, once registered, has been put to genuine use 
for the purpose of preserving a trade mark registration.87   Further, as in Specsavers, the 
CJEU summarized the Nestlé judgment as meaning that (at para 32): the ‘use’ of a mark, 
                                                             
83 ibid at [31]. Arts 15(1) and 51(1)(a) TM Regulation relate to what constitutes genuine use of a trade 
mark for the purpose of maintaining a registration.     
84 Colloseum above at n. 6. 
85 ibid at [24]. 
86 ibid at [27]. 
87 ibid at [30], 
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in its literal sense, generally encompasses both its independent use and its use as part of 
another mark taken as a whole or in conjunction with that other mark. 88  
 The CJEU judgments in Specsavers  and Colloseum make clear that when 
determining if a sign used with or in a registered mark has acquired distinctiveness, the 
prime consideration is whether from the viewpoint of the average consumer the sign is 
acting as a badge of origin on its own.  This is so even if the sign at issue is either 
mundane or descriptive.  It is therefore possible to conclude from both cases that the 
registration of any mark which contains an element which may not be distinctive on 
registration will still potentially provide a further penumbra of protection that goes 
beyond the mark as registered. In other words, non-distinctive signs might themselves 
acquire distinctiveness through their use with (as in Nestlé) or as part of (as in 
Specsavers and Colloseum) the registered mark.  For the Advocate General in Nestlé, 
recognition of such a penumbra did not present a danger of over-protection, since it 
took the view that it was unlikely that the penumbra would expand indefinitely.  That 
assumption, which was not considered in either Specsavers or Colloseum, where what 
was at issue were two separately registered marks, has of course yet to be tested. 
  Specsavers and Colloseum clarified the primary role played by the average 
consumer’s perception in determining if a sign that is used with or in a registered mark 
has acquired distinctiveness. The related issue in HAVE A BREAK, of how a mark’s 
alternative or multiple meanings are to be assessed as regards registrability (in 
particular, a slogan’s potentially simultaneous promotional and ‘badge of origin’ 
meanings), was clarified in a series of other cases, notably Smart Technologies.89 The 
case concerned an application in 2008 to register the word sign WIR MACHEN DAS 
BESONDERE EINFACH (German for ‘We make special (things) simple’) as a CTM in 
respect of a range of computerised systems, all in Class 9. The examiner refused the 
application on the ground that the mark lacked distinctive character. Appeals to the 
First Board of Appeal and the General Court were dismissed. Smart Technologies 
appealed to the CJEU, whose reasoning shows the extent to which, over the period in 
                                                             
88 ibid at [32]. It also recognized that such use would only be genuine if the mark is only used as part of, or 
as a composite mark, or in conjunction with another mark, ‘and the combination of the two marks is itself 
registered as a trade mark.’ (ibid at [35]. Colloseum was recently followed by the UK courts in Londsdale 
Sports Ltd v Erol [2013] EWHC 2956 (Pat). 
 
89 Smart Technologies, n 6 above.. 
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which the KitKat litigation took place, the courts moved on from acknowledging that 
slogans were registrable in principle to the idea that a consumer may simultaneously 
perceive both rather than either one meaning (exhortation) or another (origin) which a 
slogan might have.  
 The Court’s judgment summarised the case law related to establishing whether a 
mark, including one used as a slogan, has distinctive character.90 First, it emphasised (at 
para 39-43) that there is no subcategory of marks specifically for slogans; registration is 
not excluded by use in advertising as persuasion to purchase goods or services.  As 
regards the threshold of distinctiveness required, the Court confirmed (as had been 
established in Erpo and in Audi), that it was inappropriate to apply to slogans criteria 
stricter than those applicable to other types of sign.91 Nevertheless, the possibility could 
not be excluded that, in applying general criteria, the relevant public’s perception might 
differ with the result that it might prove more difficult to establish distinctiveness. In 
accordance with what we have described as a shift away from a public interest test 
following the TM Directive, the court also affirmed that, simply because a mark is 
perceived by the relevant public as a promotional formula (and so, because of its 
laudatory nature, would lend itself readily to use by other undertakings), that is not 
sufficient in itself to support a conclusion that that mark is devoid of distinctive 
character.92 
 For any given sign, a promotional and a ‘badge of origin’ meaning might in 
principle function together. Such a mark would be perceived by the relevant public as 
both a promotional formula and as an indication of the commercial origin of the goods 
or services concerned. It was not sufficient, therefore, in analysing distinctive character, 
merely to highlight the fact that a mark consisted of and was understood as a 
promotional formula. Rather, the mark’s overall impression has to be assessed. From 
this it follows that, insofar as the public perceives the mark as an indication of that 
origin, the fact that the mark is at the same time understood—perhaps even primarily 
understood—as a promotional formula has no bearing on its distinctive character.  As 
                                                             
90 Reference was made in particular to C-64/02 P Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade 
Marks and Designs) (OHIM) v Erpo Möbelwerk (DAS PRINZIP DER BEQUEMLICHKEIT) [2004] E.C.R. I-
10031; C-398/08 P Audi AG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) 
(OHIM) [2010] ECR I-000535. 
91 Audi v OHIM at [36]. 
92 Smart Technologies, n 6 above at [29]. 
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applied by the Court to WIR MACHEN DAS BESONDERE EINFACH, these general 
principles resulted in an assessment that the contested mark was not distinctive. The 
applicants submitted, inter alia, that the General Court had created a special category of 
’slogans’ and had therefore applied an incorrect standard.93  The CJEU held, however, 
that the lower court had merely referred to the word mark as a slogan, a concept 
developed by the case law, which did not create a special subcategory or even a 
separate category from that used in relation to other word marks. Such description, it 
was held, only asserted that the mark under consideration extolled the qualities of the 
goods covered by the trade mark application.94 
 The CJEU held that the General Court had also been correct in its examination of 
whether WIR MACHEN DAS BESONDERE EINFACH had distinctive character. Even 
though an advertising slogan cannot be required to display ’imaginativeness’ or even 
’conceptual tension which would create surprise and so make a striking impression’ in 
order to show the minimal level of distinctiveness required, 95 the relevant public would 
view WIR MACHEN DAS BESONDERE EINFACH (a combination of five standard German 
words) as containing no unusual variations in regard to German rules of syntax and 
grammar. The concise nature and terms of the slogan did not introduce any word play 
or elements of conceptual intrigue or surprise such as to confer distinctive character on 
the mark applied for in the minds of the relevant public, as had been argued in relation 
to VORSPRUNG DURCH TECHNIK in Audi. Nor did the mark applied for possess any 
particular originality or resonance to trigger in the minds of the relevant public a 
cognitive process or interpretative effort such as to make that mark, in the perception of 
that public, anything other than a mere advertising message.  
 Dismissing the appeal, the CJEU held (at paras 47-54) that the General Court had 
reached its conclusion that the mark was devoid of distinctive character not on the 
ground that it was a promotional formula but on the ground that it was not perceived by 
the relevant public as an indication of commercial origin. The General Court, the CJEU 
confirmed, had not used different or more stringent criteria to assess the slogan’s 
distinctive character from those used for other word signs. Rather it had focused on 
whether, irrespective of any promotional function, the mark possessed any distinctive 
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95 Under art.7(1)(b) of TM Regulation ; ibid at paras [28]-[30].  
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character, since – now a considerable distance from arguments submitted in the early 
stages of the KitKkat litigation - a mark consisting of an advertising slogan must be 
recognised as having distinctiveness if it may be perceived immediately as an indication 
of the commercial origin of the goods or services in question.96  
3.2. Conclusion 
 There are a number of reasons why the contrasting fates which successive 
attempts to register the slogan HAVE A BREAK met under the 1938 Act and the Trade 
Mark Directive  remain of general interest.  Perhaps most importantly, different stages 
of the HAVE A BREAK litigation extend through a period in which, we have argued, the 
courts and registering authorities moved from a wider public interest test for 
determining whether a mark is capable of registration to an average consumer test.   
 Under the 1938 Act, as we have seen, a mark could be found not to be inherently 
distinctive if it were one that other traders might legitimately wish to use.  As a result it 
might still not be registered, even if it were in fact acting in the prototypical trade mark 
way: as a badge of origin on the market. By the time of its decision in Nestlé, by contrast, 
the CJEU had made clear in a number of cases97 that there was no such exception under 
the Directive.  No mark which had acquired distinctiveness in the eyes of the average 
consumer, it had held, could be refused registration.  This was true even if, as clearly in 
the case of geographical designations, the mark was one that other traders might wish 
to use.98  In this article we have suggested that, under both the tests as applied to HAVE 
A BREAK, the social, linguistic and economic contexts in which the slogan was used 
were relevant to such an assessment.    
 Both before and after the passage of the 1994 TMA, for example, Mars presented 
evidence that the average consumer would be likely to take a break and consume a 
snack. But while in the 1970s the purpose of such evidence was to underpin an 
argument that the slogan was one which should not be monopolized by a single trader, 
in 2003 the purpose was different: to show that the average consumer did not associate 
                                                             
96 ibid at [47]-54]. 
97 Most notably, Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v Remington Consumer Products Ltd. 
[2002] ECR I-5475. 
98 See for example, Windsurfing; also Case C-51/10P Koninklijke Philips Electronics  and Agencja 
Wydawnicza Technopol sp. z.o.o. v OHIM [2011] ECR I-154.  See also, M. Blakeney, ‘The registration of 
geographical trade marks”.  
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taking a break with any particular chocolate bar, hence that the slogan lacked the 
distinctiveness required for registration.  It now appears ironic that, in countering Mars’ 
latter argument, Nestlé insisted that the category of the average consumer who took a 
snack break was a more limited category than that  of the average consumer, 
unrestricted, despite the peculiar selling point of its HAVE A BREAK slogan from the 
1950s onwards having been in effect the opposite. The relevant advertising campaigns 
had, in fact, begun with and played on a democratization of the snack break claimed to 
be taking place at that time , for which  use and resonance of the particular word ‘break’ 
was especially appropriate.  
 The mark in question did not consist of the single word ‘break’, however, but of 
the three-word phrase HAVE A BREAK. Arguably it was the multiple possible meanings 
of that phrase which proved difficult to assess. Thus, when proceedings started it was 
not straightforward to establish a sign’s ‘badge of origin’ effect for an imperative phrase 
which potentially communicated some combination of alternative meanings.  Each of 
those meanings was contested at some point, as was the likely relationship between 
them, with different interpretations leading potentially to different registration 
outcomes. Four main messages could be identified. Firstly, and minimally, the slogan 
offers general lifestyle advice: to relax by taking a ‘break’. This message foregrounds the 
slogan’s imperative force but has no connection with any particular product. In context, 
however, a more likely interpretation of the slogan involves implied encouragement to 
fill such a break by eating a chocolate bar (after choosing and buying one in order to do 
so). That contextually inferred message involves a presumption as to the relevance of 
communicating an apparently non-commercial message in a commercial setting: its 
invitation to view a break as a timely opportunity to snack on a chocolate bar, 
conveniently illustrated by the branded bar shown in accompanying advertising or 
whose name is juxtaposed on the packaging. An equivalent promotional message is 
conveyed in parallel by a different route: through the allusion contained in the three-
word slogan to the more familiar, longer version, HAVE A BREAK, HAVE A KITKAT, 
which directly states the already registered product name. Finally, there is a further, 
associative meaning achieved largely independently of the slogan’s particular words. 
Any combination of words taken together may potentially function through familiarity 
in the manner of a graphic, shape mark, sound, or numerical identifier, calling to mind a 
32 
 
situation, in this case a commercial setting, with which it becomes conventionally 
connected. This fourth kind of message may be conveyed independently of the content 
of other messages or in some combination with them. Or it might not exist at all, if the 
familiarity of the association has not been sufficiently established. It was presumably 
because the phrase HAVE A BREAK was capable of bearing any or all of these messages, 
which differ in their degree of obviousness and do not all serve the same (or in one case 
necessarily any) commercial function, that the slogan ran up against the registration 
problems we have described in this article. 
Each meaning, we have seen, was contested at some stage of the proceedings. 
Disentangling and assessing them, we have shown, depended on a sometimes subtly 
changing framework of tests and terminology both in statute and in judicial reasoning, 
even if the essential question to be addressed (whether in assessing submitted survey 
evidence or in determining the presumed expectations of an average consumer) 
remained the same: whether the slogan distinguished the goods as originating from one 
commercial undertaking rather than another. The way in which that essential question 
was formulated early in the litigation queried whether the words HAVE A BREAK 
functioned as an origin-neutral invitation to buy an associated product (i.e. as an 
advertisement), or alternatively as a trade mark, but by implication not both. That 
formulation of the question gave way in later proceedings, however, to 
acknowledgement that such a question had been settled as not an either/or issue.  More 
recently, we have seen, even the relative prominence of different meanings, where they 
can be shown to exist simultaneously, has been held not to be decisive. Rather, the 
requirement is only that one of the available meanings should be a source-identifying 
‘badge of origin’ use.  During the period we have been discussing, establishing the 
existence of different meanings, and explicating interaction or possible tension between 
them, required the courts adjudicating HAVE A BREAK to sift in an exploratory way 
through communicative complexities which were considered at the time the analysis 
was taking place potentially to obscure or nullify the source-indicator function that 
alone would make the slogan distinctive.  
 In the event, of course, the English court was never called on to make a judgment 
as to the distinctiveness of the HAVE A BREAK slogan, since Mars withdrew its 
opposition.  We have seen that the CJEU had held that such a judgment, were it to be 
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made, might be based on the Windsurfing criteria for assessing distinctiveness.   Of 
interest in this respect is the fact that Nestlé, under this approach, would have had to 
prove a positive rather than Mars being required to prove a negative.  But it is also 
possible to argue that, unlike in the earlier Rowntree Mackintosh hearings, the court 
could not have made its own decision without the benefit of actual evidence.  In the 
phase of litigation pitting Rowntree Mackintosh against Mars, Whitford J had ignored 
the survey evidence and instead presumably followed his own judgment in determining 
what the phrase HAVE A BREAK conveyed and that it was merely ‘commonplace’.  Such 
an approach should not, in principle at least, be possible if the case were decided today.  
In a line of cases starting from Windsurfing, the CJEU has made it clear that when 
assessing acquired distinctiveness it is necessary to consider evidence of use.99  In Borco  
v OHIM (2011)100, the CJEU has stressed that this is also true when the application is to 
register a trade mark which has not previously been used.  Certainly, at the present 
time, there is ongoing debate as to the utility of survey evidence in trade mark cases, 
with a recent Court of Appeal decision suggesting that such evidence is seldom 
probative and emphasizing that the average consumer may be understood as a legal 
construct, allowing the court to take its own view.101 However, it is submitted that this 
approach is relevant only to cases of confusion and that in any new struggle between 
Nestlé and Mars, evidence of acquired distinctiveness, which might include survey 
evidence, would indeed need to be adduced. 
 This brings us, finally, to another point of interest in the HAVE A BREAK 
narrative: the light it sheds on how the CJEU makes law.  When the HAVE A BREAK case 
came before the Court of Appeal in 2003, both Mummery LJ and Sedley LJ suggested 
that if this slogan were registered, such registration would represent a change of 
‘policy’, and not a change that had been envisaged under the Directive.  In particular, 
they were concerned that allowing registration of HAVE A BREAK would be wrong if it 
                                                             
99 Indeed, when the Specsavers case recently returned to the Court of Appeal, the Court held that on the 
evidence, the wordless logos had acquired indpendent distinctiveness through use.  Specsavers v Asda 
Stores [2014] EWCA 1294. 
100 Borco-Marken-Import Matthiesen GmbH & Co KG v OHIM (Case C-265/09P) [2011] ECR I-8265. 
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prevented other traders from using a commonplace phrase applied to their own goods.  
It is striking that, although in contemporary society breaks and snacks are an 
unremarkable fact of everyday life, any public interest in therefore leaving a three-word 
slogan consisting of the high-frequency but semantically bleached words ‘Have a’ and 
the phrasal head-word ‘break’ free for all traders to use in relation to their goods or 
services was not even accorded a mention in the CJEU’s Nestlé decision.   
 The comments of Mummery, LJ and Sedley, LJ tell only half the story, however.  
While the Directive does not explicitly say there is no public interest exception that 
would protect phrases which other traders may wish to use, neither does it say that 
there is one.  Rather, the CJEU has simply established definitively, in a succession of 
cases, that any sign which is distinctive as a badge of origin may be registered.102  What 
the comments of both Mummery LJ and Sedley LJ therefore underline is the extent to 
which a radical change in the direction of trade mark law, following the passage of the 
Directive, occurred without any extended discussion taking place either before or after 
its implementation about what the implications were for defining and then protecting 
the public interest.  It seems fair to suggest, as a result, that when the courts allude to 
the public interest in trade mark cases their concern is more likely prompted by some 
local ad hoc need to interpret specific wording in the Directive, as in the case of the 
registration of descriptive signs, rather than from any overarching view as to what that 
public interest might be. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
102 Apart from particular exceptions under arts 3(1)(e) and (f) CTM.  The leading decision here is 
undoubtedly Koninklijke Philips, n 95 above.   See also Case C-51/10P Agencja Wydawnicza Technopol sp. 
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